Abstract: Formally specifying hedonic well-being is difficult, but relevant to utilitarian theories of morality. In this paper we describe a starting point based on attitudinal hedonism, which posits that hedonic well-being is determined by the extent to which a moral patient believes her preferences to be fulfilled. While this assumption probably does not capture the sought-out notion of well-being fully, our formalization seems to be relevant first step towards more satisfactory definition of hedonic well-being.
Introduction 9
Recently, growing effort has been made to formalize ethics and various ethically relevant concepts, 10 not only to be more precise and avoid misunderstandings but also to be able to make machines behave 11 ethically [1, p. 297; 2, p. 251; 3, p. 19; 4] . [5] describes a formalization of preference utilitarianism 12 in world models in which agents are not ontologically fundamental entities but physical objects, in 13 particular structures in a cellular automaton. In this paper we point out how this formalization can be 14 modified to obtain a formalization of a specific version of hedonistic utilitarianism, in which happiness 15 is equated with believing that one's preferences are fulfilled. 17 Oesterheld 's [5] formalization of preference utilitarianism defines the subjective well-being of a space-time embedded agent a at time step i as its expected utility over different utility functions
A brief recap of the main ideas behind formal preference utilitarianism
where h is the true trajectory or outcome of the system a is living in, P(u | a@i) is the probability that a's goal is to maximize u and u(h) is the utility of h to a if a's utility function were u. The preference extraction P(u | a@i) is based on Bayes' theorem
where the main component P(a@i | u) is to be understood as testing how suitable a is for maximizing To formalize this strategy, we will consider what information a encodes, i.e., what one could potentially infer from a's physical configuration. This can be formalized as the expected value of the utility function u for a, i.e. E [u(h) | a], where a is not assumed to necessarily know the time step of its existence i. This gives us a new definition of an agent's welfare, its hedonic welfare:
As an example, consider the agent Anna. Her primary life goal it is to preserve the environment, 
Discussion

42
We now discuss some of the issues one may have with the given formalization of attitudinal 43 hedonism. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive. In particular we will only discuss potential 44 problems with our formalization rather than the target of our formalization (attitudinal hedonism) or 45 the aspects of the formalization borrowed from [5] .
46
Ascribing the belief E [u(h) | a] fails to capture the fact that an agent usually cannot answer queries about its entire physical configuration, let alone optimally deduce probability distributions 48 from it. Thus, it might be possible to deduce high u values from the physical structure of a with near 49 certainty, even if a does not "actually know" that u is fulfilled. While the outside-view assumption of 50 rationality works well enough for preference extraction to evade immediate and outright refutation
51
[5], it seems to fail when it comes to extracting beliefs.
52
A more plausible approach for extracting beliefs, and perhaps also extracting preferences, may 53 therefore involve abstracting away from all the irrelevant details of an organism (compare, e.g., [12, 54 ch. 3, 14] ) and consider merely the algorithm the organism is implementing (cf. 13). Specifically, we
For some discussion of the differences between hedonism and preferentism, see, e.g., 7, ch. 2-5; 8, ch. 8, 9; 9, ch. 5, 6; or 10. yields a probability of 0.01% that Bob will die in a car crash in the next year. However, like most people,
69
Bob is susceptible to base rate neglect [16] and to believing that he is a better-than-average driver [17] .
70
This leads him to feel much safer than he has reason to believe -when asked about whether he expects 71 to die in the next year, he reports a probability of only 0.0001%. Assuming that Bob prefers not to die 72 in a car crash, Bob is happier than equation 3 makes him out to be.
73
Another issue is that our formalization gives equal weight to long-held beliefs as it does to recently 74 formed ones. Arguably, this conflicts with our subjective experience. For example, learning that one Alternatively, we could try to give more weight to beliefs that the agent is currently contemplating.
81
Then happiness (suffering) would mean performing computations related to (un)fulfilled preferences.
82
Perhaps the hedonic treadmill then arises from the fact that people mostly consider new information. 
Related work
84
The main contribution of this paper is to present a formal definition of hedonic well-being that 85 can be used for the utilitarian calculus as described by [5, ch. 3.4] . A variety of (mostly informal) 
